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350 abstract
This study employs panel data for 58 countries from 1980-2010, to investigate the 
dynamic relationship between economic freedom and income inequality. Both lin-
ear and non-linear (Panel Smooth Threshold Regression) cointegration estimation 
methods are used to identify a long-run equilibrium relationship between the over-
all economic freedom index and its components, and income inequality. The linear 
long-run parameter estimates for the entire panel of countries show that the asso-
ciation is negative, while the non-linear long-run parameter estimates indicate that 
above a threshold point the association between economic freedom and income 
inequality is negative, while below this threshold point the association is positive. 
Keywords: economic freedom, Economic Freedom Index, income distribution
1 IntRoDUctIon
Economic freedom is a multifaceted concept which can have differing relations 
with income distribution at different stages of economic freedom. Kuznets (1955) 
hypothesized that as economic growth occurs, inequality in the distribution of 
income may initially increase with structural change, and then decrease in the long 
run, beyond a certain point. This proposition known as the inverted U-hypothesis, 
has relevance for the relationship between economic freedom and income distri-
bution. At the early stages of economic freedom, income inequality can increase 
due to market allocation benefiting high income groups, however, in later stages 
of economic freedom, as income rises and the standard of living overall improves, 
income inequality can fall. If the income of low-income groups grows at a faster 
rate than that of other income groups, then greater economic freedom will lead to 
greater equality in income distribution. The question this paper attempts to answer 
is whether economic freedom leads to greater equality in income distribution. 
Studies undertaken on freedom and income distribution are sparse. Additionally, 
there is no consensus in the literature as to the net impact of economic freedom on 
income distribution. Therefore, the contribution of this study to the literature is 
threefold. First, we employ both linear and non-linear panel (Panel Smooth 
Threshold Regression – PSTR) cointegration methods to investigate the relation-
ship between economic freedom and income inequality. The non-linear estimation 
methodologies provide clear information on the relationship between economic 
freedom and income inequality changes over different stages of economic free-
dom. The only studies that account for the presence of thresholds in the economic 
freedom-income inequality relationship are those by Carter (2006) and Bennett 
and Vedder (2013). 
We advance upon these studies by using the PSTR estimation method which al-
lows the income inequality-economic freedom coefficient to vary not only across 
countries, but also over time. We also employ the Economic Freedom Index (EFI) 
of Gwartney et al. (2006) to measure economic freedom, and the Gini coefficient 
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351could lead to growth and reduce inequality more than other components. How-
ever, the current literature investigates the effects of different EFI components on 
economic growth. For this reason, this paper also investigates the impact of the 
different components of the EFI (i.e., size, taxation and labour structure) on in-
come inequality. Third, there could be regional heterogenenity in the relationship 
between the EFI and income inequality. Accordingly, we account for this regional 
heterogeneity by conducting the analysis not only at the overall level, but also 
separately for each region.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature. Section 3 
presents the data including unit root tests. Section 4 presents empirical results for 
the linear model, and robustness tests across components of the EFI and across re-
gions. Section 5 presents results for the non-linear model and section 6 concludes.
2 tHe lIteRatURe
Studies which investigate the relationship between economic freedom and income 
inequality include those by Berggren (1999), Scully (2002), Ashby and Sobel 
(2008), Carter (2006) and Apergis et al. (2013). Berggren (1999) argues that an 
increase in economic freedom leads to lower taxes, a relaxation of regulations, 
and higher economic growth. Scully (2002) examines the role of economic free-
dom in income distribution for a pooled sample of 26 countries using the EFI of 
Gwartney et al. (2006). The author concludes that economic freedom leads to 
greater equality with the existence of a marginal trade-off between growth and 
income inequality. Employing an unbalanced panel of 126 countries and the EFI, 
Carter (2006) argues that higher levels of economic freedom can increase income 
equality by extending income-earning prospects, but also reduce equality by di-
minishing income redistribution opportunities. He finds that the latter effect out-
weighs the former except at very low levels of freedom; therefore, implying a 
trade-off between economic freedom and income equality, with the impact of eco-
nomic freedom increasing at higher levels of freedom. Clark and Lawson (2008) 
investigate the role of tax policy in income distribution and they document evi-
dence in favour of increased income equality due to progressive taxation with 
high top marginal tax rates. Bennett and Vedder (2013) investigate the dynamic 
relationship between economic freedom and income inequality across the U.S. 
states. They provide robust evidence showing that increases in economic freedom 
are associated with lower income inequality. However, they also provide support-
ive evidence that the relationship depends on the initial level of economic free-
dom, implying that there may be an inverted U-shaped relationship with the in-
flection point being explicitly determined.
Ashby and Sobel (2008) investigate the link between economic freedom and in-
come distribution across U.S. states using the Economic Freedom of North Amer-
ica Index (EFNA), as introduced by Karabegovic and McMahon (2005). Their re-
sults highlight that increases in economic freedom correspond with lower inequal-
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352 economic freedom across the U.S. Their findings document bi-directional causality 
between economic freedom and income inequality in both the short- and long- run. 
Given the inconclusive results on the relationship between economic freedom and 
inequality, in the empirical analysis that follows we extend upon the literature by 
accounting for non-linear (i.e., threshold) effects, and investigate the relationship 
between economic freedom and inequality across components of the EFI and 
across regions. Our results demonstrate that the relationship between economic 
freedom and income inequality is non-linear.
3 Data
3.1 Data
The data for this study include annual observations over 1980-2010 for an unbal-
anced panel of 58 countries which constitutes a representative cross-section of the 
regions covering Europe, Asia, the Americas (North and South) and the Pacific. 
The list of countries is provided in the appendix. The unbalanced panel is associ-
ated with a number of countries in which data availability prompted for using data 
over the 1991-2010 time span. These countries included in this particular sample 
were: Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
The variables include: the Gini coefficient (GI), proxying for inequality is the 
dependent variable. The Gini coefficient can vary anywhere from 0 (perfect in-
come equality) to 1 (perfect income inequality). The primary independent variable 
of interest is the economic freedom Index (EFI). The EFI measures the degree 
of economic freedom in five main areas: (1) Size of Government; (2) Legal Sys-
tem and Security of Property Rights; (3) Sound Money; (4) Freedom to Trade In-
ternationally; (5) Regulation. Within these five main areas there are 24 compo-
nents. Each component is measured from 0 (“no economic freedom”) to 10 (“full 
economic freedom”). Gwartney and Lawson (2002) argue that economic freedom 
declines when taxes, government expenditures, and regulations are substituted for 
personal preference, voluntary exchange, and market coordination. Accordingly, 
we examine the effects not only of the overall index, but also individual compo-
nents of the index that are important for creating greater equality in income, on 
income distribution. These components include: the size of government (SIZE), 
proxied by the sum of general government consumption expenditures as percent-
age of GDP + total transfers and subsidies as percentage of GDP + social security 
payments as percentage of GDP, total tax revenues as percentage of GDP (TAX), 
and labour market freedom (LAB), proxied by the sum of the minimum wage 
legislation index + union density. 
Other control variables used are based upon the previous literature. We include Per 
capita income (CAPY) to capture the level of development of a country (Carter 
2006), the Unemployment rate (U), and the share of population over the age 65 
(POP65) to capture welfare expenditures of the government (Carter, 2006), and the 
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353While some data for variables go back to 1970, a complete panel with no missing 
values is currently available for all countries for only the years 1980-2010. There-
fore our study covers this time period. The economic freedom data are from the 
Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (Free the World.com site) index 
compiled by Gwartney et al. (2006). The rest of the data series are from Datastream. 
3.2 UnIt Root tests
We begin the analysis by examining the presence of cross-sectional dependence. 
Panel unit root tests of the first-generation can lead to spurious results (because of 
size distortions) if significant degrees of positive residual cross-section depend-
ence exist and are yet ignored. Consequently, the implementation of second-gen-
eration panel unit root tests is desirable only when it has been established that the 
panel is subject to a significant degree of residual cross-section dependence. In 
cases in which cross-section dependence is not sufficiently high, a loss of power 
might result if second-generation panel unit root tests that allow for cross-section 
dependence are employed. Therefore, before selecting the appropriate panel unit 
root test, it is crucial to provide some evidence on the degree of residual cross-
section dependence.
The cross-sectional dependence (CD) statistic by Pesaran (2004) is based on a sim-
ple average of all pair-wise correlation coefficients of the OLS residuals obtained 
from standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) regressions for each variable in the 
panel. Under the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence, the CD test sta-
tistic follows asymptotically a two-tailed standard normal distribution. The results 
reported in table 1 uniformly reject the null hypothesis of cross-section independ-
ence, providing evidence of cross-sectional dependence in the data. The statistical 
significance of the CD statistics signifies the presence of cross dependence, irre-
spectively of the number of lags (i.e., from 1 to 4) included in the ADF regressions.
Table 1
Cross-section dependence (CD) test: cross-section correlations of the residuals in 
ADF(p) regressions
Variables lags
1 2 3 4
EFI [0.00]a [0.00]a [0.00]a [0.04]b
GI [0.00]a [0.00]a [0.00]a [0.00]a
SIZE [0.00]a [0.00]a [0.00]a [0.00]a
YTAX [0.00]a [0.00]a [0.02]b [0.03]b
LAB [0.00]a [0.02]b [0.00]a [0.02]b
CAPY [0.03]b [0.00]a [0.02]b [0.03]b
U [0.00]a [0.04]b [0.00]a [0.00]a
POP65 [0.00]a [0.00]a [0.02]b [0.01]a
COL [0.00]a [0.00]a [0.00]a [0.01]a
Notes: under the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence the CD statistic is distribu ted 
as a two tailed standard normal. Results are based on the test of Pesaran (2004). Figures in 
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354 Two second-generation panel unit root tests are employed to determine the degree 
of integration in the respective variables. The Pesaran (2007) panel unit root test 
does not require the estimation of factor loading to eliminate cross-sectional de-
pendence. Specifically, the usual ADF regression is augmented to include the 
lagged cross-sectional mean and its first difference to capture the cross-sectional 
dependence that arises through a single-factor model. The null hypothesis of the 
Pesaran (2007) test implies the presence of a unit root across all variables under 
investigation. The bootstrap panel unit root tests by Smith et al. (2004) utilize a 
sieve sampling scheme to account for both the time series and cross-sectional 
dependence in the data through bootstrap blocks. All four tests by Smith et al. 
(2004) are constructed with a unit root under the null hypothesis and heterogene-
ous autoregressive roots under the alternative hypothesis. The results of these 
panel unit root tests are reported in table 2 and support of the presence of a unit 
root in all variables under consideration.
Table 2





smith et al. 
t-test
smith et al. 
lM-test
smith et al. 
max-test
smith et al. 
min-test
EFI -1.35 -1.41 -1.52 3.02 -1.25 1.45
ΔEFI -5.62a -5.33a -5.42a 18.93a -6.72a 6.53a
GI -1.28 -1.26 -1.25 3.15 -1.39 1.28
ΔGI -5.69a -5.31a -6.34a 17.5la -7.85a 7.31a
SIZE -1.14 -1.22 -1.28 2.36 -1.43 1.25
ΔSIZE -6.44a -6.58a -5.73a 16.74a -8.74a 6.56a
YTAX -1.52 -1.52 -1.34 1.23 -1.29 1.18
ΔYTAX -7.49a -6.42a -5.63a 15.98a -7.81a 6.75a
LAB -1.35 -1.34 -1.36 1.22 -1.25 1.26
ΔLAB -7.54a -6.16a -6.65a 18.85a -8.53a 7.64a
CAPY -1.22 -1.33 -1.34 1.51 -1.34 1.48
ΔCAPY -5.54a -5.5la -5.82a 18.95a -6.84a 6.81a
U -1.29 -1.30 -1.44 1.12 -1.37 1.26
ΔU -7.23a -6.63a -5.81a 18.98a -7.66a 7.22a
POP65 -1.36 -1.33 -1.35 1.19 -1.34 1.28
ΔPOP65 -5.52a -5.44a -7.83a 17.92a -5.78a 5.79a
COL -1.26 -1.31 -1.34 1.46 -1.22 1.35
ΔCOL -5.71a -5.52a -6.59a 17.85a -5.74a 6.53a
Notes: Δ denotes first differences. A constant is included in the Pesaran (2007) tests. Rejection 
of the null hypothesis indicates stationarity in at least one country. CIPS* = truncated CIPS test. 
Critical values for the Pesaran (2007) test are -2.40 at 1%, -2.22 at 5%, and -2.14 at 10%, respec-
tively, a denotes rejection of the null hypothesis. Both a constant and a time trend are included in 
the Smith et al. (2004) tests. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates stationarity in at least one 
country. For both tests the results are reported at lag = 4. The null hypothesis is that of a unit root. 
Given that the respective variables are integrated of order one, we perform the 
Pedroni (1999, 2004) heterogeneous panel cointegration test to determine whether 
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GIit = αi + δi t + β1i EFIit + β2i CAPYit + β3i Uit + β4i POP65it + β5i COLit + εit (1)
where i = 1, ..., N for each state in the panel and t = 1, ..., T refers to the time period. 
The parameters αi  and δi allow for the possibility of country-specific fixed effects 
and deterministic trends, respectively. In light of the specification of equation (1), 
we proceed with testing the null hypothesis of no cointegration, ρi = 1, based on a 
unit root test of the residuals:
 εit = ρiεit-1 + wit (2)
where the estimated residuals, εit, represent deviations from the long-run equilib-
rium relationship. Following Pedroni (1999, 2004) both within-dimension and 
between-dimension approaches to panel cointegration tests are performed. The 
panel tests based on the within-dimension approach (panel v, panel ρ, panel PP, 
and panel ADF-statistics) essentially pool the autoregressive coefficients across 
different states for the unit root tests on the estimated residuals, taking into ac-
count common time factors and heterogeneity across states. The group mean panel 
tests based on the between-dimension approach (group ρ, group PP, and group 
ADF-statistics) are founded on averages of the individual autoregressive coeffi-
cients associated with the unit root tests of the residuals for each state in the panel. 
All seven test statistics, as shown in Panel A of table 3, reject the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration at the 1% significance level. 
Table 3 
Panel cointegration tests, FMOLS and DOLS estimates
Panel a: Panel cointegration tests
Panel test statistics: Group Mean Panel test statistics:
Panel v-statistic 39.89566* Group ρ-statistic -39.78508*
Panel ρ-statistic -38.80943* Group PP-statistic -38.24369*
Panel PP-statistic -38.78062* Group ADF-statistic -7.69045*
Panel ADF-statistic -7.83287*
Notes: both the panel and group mean panel tests are distributed asymptotically as standard 
normal. Of the seven tests, the panel v-statistic is a one-sided test in which large positive val-
ues reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. For the remaining test statistics, large nega-
tive values reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Statistical significance at the 1% sig-
nificance level is denoted by *. 
Panel b: fMols and Dols long-run parameter estimates
fMols
GI = 2.613 – 0.128 EFI + 0.224 CAPY – 0.129 U + 0.068POP65 – 0.115COL 
    (14.6)* (-12.3)*    (10.8)*      (-6.19)*     (5.86)*         (-7.14)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.57  LM = 1.12 RESET = 1.37
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356 DolsGI = 1.984 – 0.109 EFI + 0.207 CAPY – 0.114 U + 0.059POP65 – 0.103COL 
    (11.4)* (-8.53)*    (8.75)*      (-5.86)*     (5.25)*         (-5.92)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.63  LM = 1.38 RESET = 1.54
       [0.33]                         [0.18]
Notes: t-statistics and probability values are reported in parentheses and brackets, respectively. 
LM is the Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation. RESET is Ramsey’s regression equation 
specification error test. Statistical significance at the 1% level is denoted by *.
4 eMPIRIcal ResUlts
4.1 lonG-RUn Panel PaRaMeteR estIMates
With the presence of cointegration we employ the fully modified OLS (FMOLS) 
technique for heterogeneous cointegrated panels (Pedroni, 2000) to arrive at the 
long-run parameter estimates.1 Panel B of table 3 displays the long-run parameter 
estimates of equation (1) based on FMOLS. The Economic Freedom Index yields 
a statistically significant negative coefficient with respect to the Inequality Index 
(i.e., Gini). Both per capita income and the share of population over 65 render a 
statistically significant positive impact on income inequality, while both the un-
employment rate and the college attainment rate exert a statistically significant 
negative impact on income inequality. 
The results show that a one unit increase in the Economic Freedom Index decre-
ases income inequality by about 0.128. These findings are consistent with other 
studies in the relevant literature (Berggren, 1999; Scully, 2002; Ashby and Sobel, 
2008). By contrast, our findings are not consistent with those provided by Carter 
(2006), which could be significantly attributed to the differentiation in methodolo-
gies used across the two studies. Furthermore, the positive estimates, associated 
with per capita income and the share of population over 65, support the notion that 
both variables contribute to higher income inequality. The positive association 
between income inequality and income per capita suggest a trade-off between 
higher income per capita and greater income equality. A positive relationship be-
tween income and inequality are supported in the studies of Voitchovsky (2005), 
Forbes (2000), Li and Zhou (1998), Barro (1998), while Deininger and Squire 
(1996) do not find a strong relationship between growth and changes in aggregate 
inequality. Voitchovsky (2005) suggests that redistributive policies in industrial 
nations such as progressive taxation and social welfare payments could foster 
growth through its effect on lower segments of the distribution, and yet also 
dampen growth through their effects on the top end of the distribution. Forbes 
(2000) similarly, suggests that a larger share of government spending on basic 
needs such as health and education, which are positively associated with growth, 
tend to be negatively correlated with inequality, leading to a positive relation be-
tween income inequality and growth. A similar argument is put forward by Li and 
1 The estimates from either FMOLS or Dynamic OLS (DOLS) are asymptotically equivalent for more than 
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357Zhou (1998) who find that greater income inequality could lead to higher eco-
nomic growth if government consumption enters the utility function.
The results indicate negative coefficients on both the unemployment rate and col-
lege attainment which are consistent with the notion that a better educated popula-
tion leads to lower income inequality, while higher unemployment rates also yield 
higher probabilities of a more income unequal economy. In terms of the income 
inequality-unemployment nexus, the results indicate a trade-off between income 
inequality and unemployment, which is consistent with the presence of a trade-off 
between higher per capita income and greater income equality. Browning and 
Johnson (1984) argue that redistributive policies are not costless. The disposable 
incomes of lower income groups are increased, by reducing the disposable income 
of higher income groups. As taxes are levied on labour income, this has negative 
implications for labour supply. There is also a view in the literature that increases 
in unemployment and wage inequality are “alternative” results of changes in the 
structure of the demand for labour which could imply a trade-off between income 
inequality and increasing unemployment. Panel B in table 3 also provides robust 
evidence in terms of Dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimates recommended by Saik-
konen (1992) and Kao and Chiang (2000). These additional findings confirm 
those reached earlier. 
4.2 RobUstness tests: acRoss tHe coMPonents of tHe efI InDeX
While table 3 presents the long-run parameter estimates for the entire panel of 
states, we present the long-run parameter estimates across the components of the 
EFI index defined in the data section, i.e. size, taxation and labour structure. The 
new results are reported in table 4. 
Table 4




Panel test statistics: Group Mean Panel test statistics:
Panel v-statistic 42.18239* Group ρ-statistic -42.37562*
Panel ρ-statistic -40.93472* Group PP-statistic -40.67329*
Panel PP-statistic -40.29804* Group ADF-statistic -8.89451*
Panel ADF-statistic -8.72373*
Panel cointegration tests-taX
Panel test statistics: Group Mean Panel test statistics:
Panel v-statistic 41.88934* Group ρ-statistic -40.56052*
Panel ρ-statistic -39.72385* Group PP-statistic -39.95413*
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358 Panel cointegration tests-lab
Panel test statistics: Group Mean Panel test statistics:
Panel v-statistic 36.37494* Group ρ-statistic -35.60842*
Panel ρ-statistic -34.47081* Group PP-statistic -34.89521*
Panel PP-statistic -34.27423* Group ADF-statistic -6.16094*
Panel ADF-statistic -6.36586*
Notes: similar to table 2. 
Panel b: fMols and Dols long-run parameter estimates 
sIZe (fMols)
GI = 1.784 – 0.174 EFI + 0.247 CAPY – 0.148 U + 0.042POP65 – 0.149COL 
    (10.4)* (-9.28)*    (8.71)*      (-7.28)*     (4.31)*         (-6.58)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.61  LM = 1.04 RESET = 1.31
       [0.48]                         [0.29]
sIZe (Dols)
GI = 1.427 – 0.158 EFI + 0.219 CAPY – 0.126 U + 0.033POP65 – 0.125COL 
    (8.51)* (-7.13)*    (6.68)*      (-5.84)*     (4.17)*         (-5.92)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.65  LM = 1.38 RESET = 1.62
       [0.41]                         [0.21]
taX (fMols)
GI = 0.652 – 0.116 EFI + 0.219 CAPY – 0.138 U + 0.036POP65 – 0.119COL 
    (1.51)*** (-4.74)*   (6.36)*      (-4.64)*     (4.15)*         (-5.11)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.49  LM = 1.25 RESET = 1.50
       [0.39]                         [0.17]
taX (Dols)
GI = 0.538 – 0.102 EFI + 0.194 CAPY – 0.116 U + 0.028POP65 – 0.098COL 
    (1.94)** (-4.58)*   (5.82)*      (-4.29)*     (4.04)*         (-4.84)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.54  LM = 1.59 RESET = 1.64
       [0.28]                         [0.15]
lab (fMols)
GI = 0.349 – 0.086 EFI + 0.184 CAPY – 0.125 U + 0.032POP65 – 0.138COL 
    (1.04)  (-4.27)*   (5.19)*      (-4.28)*     (4.03)*         (-5.62)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.45  LM = 1.21 RESET = 1.57
       [0.43]                         [0.15]
lab (Dols)
GI = 0.327 – 0.065 EFI + 0.152 CAPY – 0.112 U + 0.025POP65 – 0.125COL 
    (0.85)  (-4.14)*    (4.85)*      (-4.09)*     (4.36)*         (-5.81)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.49  LM = 1.49 RESET = 1.76
       [0.35]                         [0.11]
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359Panel A documents the presence of a cointegrating relationship between income 
inequality and each component of the EFI index. Once such a long-run equilibrium 
relationship is acknowledged across the EFI components, Panel B reports the long-
run estimations. The empirical findings highlight the negative association between 
income inequality measures and the three metrics of the EFI index, while the re-
maining model coefficients retain their expected sign. Comparing the estimates in 
Panel B, we find substantial variation in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients. 
In particular, the highest (negative) impact on income inequality comes from the 
SIZE component, e.g. 0.174 vs 0.116 and 0.086 for the TAX and the LABOR free-
dom components, respectively. In other words, reducing the intervention of the 
public-government sector in the economy will act as an incentive for economic 
forces to boost economic activity and, thus to reduce stronger income inequality, 
relatively to lower taxation and deregulation of the labour market. Finally, all three 
estimated equations satisfy a number of diagnostic criteria, giving our estimates a 
higher validity. These results raise questions regarding the effectiveness of activities 
supporting higher economic freedom to reduce income inequality.
 
4.3 RobUstness tests: acRoss ReGIons
We repeat the above analysis across regions and the new results are reported in 
table 5. These regional results indicate (once again) the presence of a long-run 
association between income inequality and both the overall and the disaggregated 
components of the EFI index (Panel A).
Table 5
Panel cointegration tests, FMOLS and DOLS estimates (across regions)
Panel a
Panel cointegration tests-europe (23 countries, 647 obs.)
Panel test statistics: Group Mean Panel test statistics:
Panel v-statistic 45.83471* Group ρ-statistic -44.54372*
Panel ρ-statistic -44.32449* Group PP-statistic -44.79045*
Panel PP-statistic -44.87053* Group ADF-statistic -9.54522*
Panel ADF-statistic -9.72654*
Panel cointegration tests-america (17 countries, 527 obs.)
Panel test statistics: Group Mean Panel test statistics:
Panel v-statistic 40.92286* Group ρ-statistic -38.62267*
Panel ρ-statistic -38.55437* Group PP-statistic -38.33426*
Panel PP-statistic -38.63792* Group ADF-statistic -7.10773*
Panel ADF-statistic -7.16739*
Panel cointegration tests-asia (17 countries, 527 obs.)
Panel test statistics: Group Mean Panel test statistics:
Panel v-statistic 48.91256* Group ρ-statistic -46.21378*
Panel ρ-statistic -46.19875* Group PP-statistic -46.54384*
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360 Panel cointegration tests-Pacific (2 countries, 62 obs.)
Panel test statistics: Group Mean Panel test statistics:
Panel v-statistic 42.65420* Group ρ-statistic -40.70633*
Panel ρ-statistic -40.75298* Group PP-statistic -40.41245*
Panel PP-statistic -40.13529* Group ADF-statistic -7.29745*
Panel ADF-statistic -7.31277*
Notes: similar to table 3. 
Panel b: fMols long-run parameter estimates 
europe (fMols)
GI = 1.235 – 0.283 EFI + 0.319 CAPY – 0.239 U + 0.138POP65 – 0.257COL 
    (14.6)* (-8.29)*    (8.25)*      (-9.55)*     (6.72)*         (-5.16)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.67  LM = 1.18 RESET = 1.45
       [0.42]                         [0.21]
europe (Dols)
GI = 1.069 – 0.247 EFI + 0.296 CAPY – 0.206 U + 0.119POP65 – 0.236COL 
    (9.84)* (-7.73)*    (7.38)*      (-7.91)*     (5.90)*         (-4.82)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.69  LM = 1.47 RESET = 1.72
       [0.34]                         [0.15]
americas (fMols)
GI = 1.458 – 0.225 EFI + 0.276 CAPY – 0.163 U + 0.079POP65 – 0.271COL 
    (8.17)*  (-6.38)*    (6.94)*      (-5.23)*     (4.82)*         (-7.63)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.65  LM = 1.29 RESET = 1.31
       [0.37]                         [0.28]
americas (Dols)
GI = 1.174 – 0.203 EFI + 0.238 CAPY – 0.139 U + 0.061POP65 – 0.248COL 
    (6.72)*  (-5.62)*    (6.37)*      (-5.49)*     (4.45)*         (-6.41)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.67  LM = 1.50 RESET = 1.64
       [0.29]                         [0.22]
asia (fMols)
GI = 1.018 – 0.109 EFI + 0.138 CAPY – 0.072 U + 0.058POP65 – 0.170COL 
    (4.29)*  (-5.32)*    (4.57)*      (-4.61)*     (3.84)*         (-5.97)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.60  LM = 1.39 RESET = 1.84
       [0.35]                         [0.10]
asia (Dols)
GI = 0.862 – 0.095 EFI + 0.125 CAPY – 0.063 U + 0.052POP65 – 0.156COL 
    (4.46)*  (-5.14)*    (4.72)*      (-4.38)*     (4.05)*         (-5.51)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.66  LM = 1.52 RESET = 1.67
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361Pacific (FMOLS)GI = 1.338 – 0.169 EFI + 0.122 CAPY – 0.035 U + 0.039POP65 – 0.153COL 
    (4.57)*  (-5.88)*    (4.19)*      (-3.84)*     (3.65)*         (-5.27)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.52  LM = 1.62 RESET = 1.95
       [0.22]                         [0.13]
Pacific (DOLS)
GI = 1.187 – 0.144 EFI + 0.109 CAPY – 0.032 U + 0.034POP65 – 0.138COL 
    (4.38)*  (-5.36)*    (4.47)*      (-4.01)*     (3.91)*         (-4.97)*       
Adj. R2 = 0.58  LM = 1.77 RESET = 1.62
       [0.18]                         [0.19]
Notes: similar to table 3.
Panel B reports the long-run regional estimations. The new empirical findings 
highlight the negative association between income inequality measures and the 
three metrics of the EFI index, while the remaining model coefficients still retain 
their expected sign. Comparing the estimates in Panel B, we find substantial vari-
ation in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients across regions. In particular, 
the highest (negative) impact on income inequality comes from the European 
area, e.g. 0.273 vs 0.225, 0.109 and 0.169 for America, Asia and Pacific, respec-
tively. This is possibly due to the very high tax rates in Europe, and then in the 
American region, which are used to finance government consumption. Therefore 
reducing the size of the public-government sector in the European economies will 
provide more solid support to economic forces to boost economic activity and, 
thus, to reduce income inequality in a stronger manner. Once again, all four re-
gional estimated equations satisfy a number of diagnostics. 
5 a non-lIneaR aPPRoacH
There is a particular strand in the literature that supports the way an economic free-
dom index changes over time, i.e. it takes time for economic freedom reforms to 
affect the course of income inequality (Berggren, 2003; De Haan et al., 2006; 
Gwartney et al., 2006; Hall et al., 2010). According to this literature, the employ-
ment of a linear methodological framework like the one used above tends not to 
capture the exact form of the relationship under scrutiny. At the same time, the 
economies included in our sample are at different stages of development, while they 
run different economic institutions and policies through which they affect not only 
the course of the real economy, but also distribution policies and, therefore, the in-
come inequality pattern. According to Kuznets (1955), as economies grow, inequal-
ity rises until a critical level of income is reached. In this case, inequality begins to 
decline. In other words, initially the benefits coming from the growth process are 
creamed off by the upper part of the income distribution, while beyond a threshold 
growth point these benefits reach the lower part of the same distribution. 
In terms of our analysis, initial levels of economic freedom benefit the upper level 
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362 in the early stages of expansion, investments are undertaken extensively by those 
who possess the physical and human capital resources that allow the economy to 
grow in terms of entrepreneurship and higher trade transactions, thus leading to 
higher income inequality. As economic freedom keeps rising and growth contin-
ues, new economic opportunities are disseminated among all who could not be part 
of the growth process. Eventually, the low-level participants in economic distribu-
tion are also capable of reaping the benefits of economic growth and, thus, income 
inequality starts to decline. According to Barro (2000), the link between economic 
growth and income inequality is based on the assumption that the “distribution of 
political power is more egalitarian than the distribution of economic power”, indi-
cating the inability of policies fighting income inequality to induce improvements 
in equality, for reasons probably related to rent-seeking and corruption. Moreover, 
growth can lead to increased inequality due to the presence of mechanisms that 
affect the revenues used to finance redistribution policies. In particular, such reve-
nues are raised through distortionary taxation that provides a disincentive to work. 
If the power of such disincentives is high, then particular groups in the population, 
especially those who are near the eligibility level for transfer programs, may be-
come dependent on the government for transfers, which leads to stagnation in in-
comes. By contrast, those who remain in the labour market continue to acquire 
higher levels of human capital and thus they can experience income gains; as a re-
sult, an increase in income inequality is observed (Cox and Alm, 1995). Finally, 
Vedder et al. (1988) argue that growth could not reduce inequality due to the pres-
ence of the crowding out of private sector charity and the capitalization of public 
transfer payments (Gruber and Hungerman, 2007; Tullock, 1986).
We make use of the Panel Smooth Threshold Regression (PSTR) model, proposed 
by Gonzàlez et al. (2005) and Fok et al. (2005), which authorizes a smooth transi-
tion, for a number of thresholds, as well as for a continuum of regimes. This ap-
proach presents two main advantages: first of all, a PSTR specification allows the 
income inequality-economic freedom coefficient to vary not only across coun-
tries, but also over time. Secondly, this approach allows for a smooth change in 
country-specific correlation depending upon the threshold variables. This meth-
odological approach allows our study to analyze the role of income in determining 
income inequality-economic freedom non-linearity by dividing the data depend-
ing upon their per capita GDP.
Let us assume the simplest case of a PSTR with two extreme regimes and a single 
transition function to illustrate the income inequality-economic freedom relationship; 
 GIit = αi + β0’EFIi,t + β1EFIit x Γ(qit; γ,c) + δ’zit + εit  (3)
where zit is a k-dimensional vector of control variables defined above, αi represents 
the individual fixed effects, and εit is the error term. The transition function is con-
tinuous and depends on the threshold variable qit; c is a vector of location parame-
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363Gonzàlez et al. (2005) propose a testing procedure in the following order: (1) test 
linearity against the PSTR model, and (2) determine the number r of transition 
functions. The test of linearity in the PSTR model can be done by testing H0: γ = 0 
or H0: β1= 0. But under the null hypothesis, the test will be non-standard in both 
cases, and the PSTR model contains unidentified nuisance parameters. A possible 
solution is to replace the transition function Γ(qit; γ,c) by its first-order Taylor ex-
pression around γ = 0 and to test an equivalent hypothesis in an auxiliary regres-
sion. We then obtain: 
 GIit = αi + θ0’EFIit + θ1’EFIitqit + δ’zit + ε*it  (4) 
Since θi parameters are proportional to the slope parameter of transition function 
γ, testing the linearity of income inequality-economic freedom model against 
PSTR consists of testing H0: θ1= 0 against H1: θ1 ≠ 0. If we denote SSR0 the panel 
sum of squared residuals under H0 and SSR1 the PSTR model with m regimes, then 
the corresponding F-statistic is then defined by: LMF = [(SSR0 – SSR1) / mK] / 
[SSR0 / (TN-N-mK)], which follows an F test with mK and TN-N-mK degrees of 
freedom. Finally, T, N and K stand for the number of time, number of countries 
and number of exogenous variables, respectively. 
Before proceeding with the non-linear estimates, we check the linearity vs the non-
linearity case. The results of the specification tests are presented in table 6. The table 
shows the p-value of both the Lagrange multiplier and the Likelihood-ratio test for 
the null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of the PSTR specification. The 
findings highlight that the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected at the 1% signifi-
cance level. The results imply that there exists a non-linear relationship between the 
Economic Freedom Index and income inequality in our country sample.
Table 6
LM and LR test of linearity
statistic p-value
Lagrange Multiplier test (LM)  5.81 0.00
Likelihood Ratio test (LR) 23.48 0.00
Notes: * denotes significance at 1%.
Table 7 presents the empirical findings of the income inequality-economic free-
dom relationship, actualized by the PSTR model. As PSTR starts with defining the 
degree of non-linearity and the number of thresholds (no remaining heteroge-
neity), our preliminary findings guide us in our selection of the number of transi-
tion functions. In our case, the residual sum of squares and the criteria of informa-
tion lead us to choose one threshold level and one transition function. Our speci-
fication is based on the linear model estimation reported above, showing the over-
all effect of the Economic Freedom Index on income inequality. This linear model 
is used as benchmark for any other specifications and allows us to show the effect 
of economic freedom, in addition to its effects that appear after thresholds cap-



































































 0.143 EFIb + 0.253 CAPY – 0.148 U + 0.053 POP65 – 0.249 COL
 (4.52)*      (5.11)*      (-4.85)*   (5.29)*      (-5.61)*
GI = 
 -0.184 EFIa + 0.286 CAPY – 0.175 U + 0.091 POP65 – 0.218 COL
 (-4.09)*      (5.67)*      (-5.93)*   (5.29)*      (-6.39)*
q = 6.673  LMF [0.01]
efI-sIZe
 0.161 EFIb + 0.264 CAPY – 0.151 U + 0.060 POP65 – 0.237 COL
 (4.78)*      (5.39)*      (-4.83)*  (5.72)*      (-4.88)*
GI =
 -0.238 EFIa + 0.316 CAPY – 0.163 U + 0.083 POP65 – 0.260 COL
 (-5.14)*      (5.94)*      (-6.37)*  (6.11)*       (-6.83)*
q = 6.218  LMF [0.00]
efI-taX
 0.133 EFIb + 0.258 CAPY – 0.109 U + 0.039 POP65 – 0.198 COL
 (5.31)*       (5.24)*     (-4.81)*   (5.34)*      (-5.86)*
GI =
 -0.174 EFIa + 0.285 CAPY – 0.126 U + 0.053 POP65 – 0.219 COL
 ( -5.97)*      (5.13)*      (-4.93)*   (4.27)*       (-5.34)*
q = 4.856  LMF [0.00]
efI-lab
 0.124 EFIb + 0.168 CAPY – 0.086 U + 0.028 POP65 – 0.178 COL
 (4.99)*       (5.42)*     (-4.82)*   (4.81)*       (-5.24)*
GI =
 -0.153 EFIa + 0.219 CAPY – 0.107 U + 0.036 POP65 – 0.212 COL
 (-4.28)*      (5.48)*      (-4.11)*   (4.02)*       (-4.72)*
q = 4.137  LMF [0.00]
efI-eURoPe
 0.158 EFIb + 0.285 CAPY – 0.125 U + 0.077 POP65 – 0.214 COL
 (5.32)*      (5.26)*      (-4.31)*  (4.58)*        (-5.61)*
GI =
 -0.165 EFIa + 0.316 CAPY – 0.193 U + 0.105 POP65 – 0.237 COL
 (-5.86)*       (6.32)*     (-5.64)*   (4.82)*       (-6.44)*
q = 5.319  LMF [0.00]
efI-aMeRIca
 0.144 EFIb + 0.256 CAPY – 0.104 U + 0.082 POP65 – 0.203 COL
 (5.24)*      (5.37)*      (-4.76)*   (4.91)*       (-5.17)*
GI =
 -0.162 EFIa + 0.309 CAPY – 0.152 U + 0.102 POP65 – 0.231 COL
 (-5.57)*       (6.25)*      (-5.48)*   (4.90)*       (-5.83)*
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365efI-asIa 0.131 EFIb + 0.256 CAPY – 0.147 U + 0.086 POP65 – 0.236 COL
 (5.47)*      (5.39)*      (-4.95)*   (4.82)*       (-5.48)*
GI =
 -0.172 EFIa + 0.304 CAPY – 0.186 U + 0.114 POP65 – 0.249 COL
 (-5.59)*       (6.15)*      (-5.37)*   (4.98)*       (-6.13)*
q = 4.360  LMF [0.00]
efI-PacIfIc
 0.153 EFIb + 0.214 CAPY – 0.107 U + 0.048 POP65 – 0.226 COL
 (5.61)*      (4.68)*      (-4.58)*   (4.49)*       (-5.48)*
GI =
 -0.169 EFIa + 0.265 CAPY – 0.147 U + 0.055 POP65 – 0.205 COL
 (-5.26)*       (6.10)*      (-5.42)*   (4.96)*       (-6.02)*
q = 5.082  LMF [0.00]
Notes: b denotes “below” and  a denotes “above”, q is the threshold parameter. Figures in brackets 
denote p-values, while those in parentheses denote t-statistics. The LMF statistic measures whether 
the regime switching is significant or not, i.e. the test of linearity versus PSTR. The remaining notes 
are similar to those in table 3. 
The economic freedom threshold appears at 6.67. Nevertheless, the EFI effect 
below this level is positive and statistically significant and above this level it is 
negative and statistically significant. Indeed, under the regime of higher economic 
freedom (>6.67), other things being equal, an increase of 1 unit in economic free-
dom reduces income inequality by 0.184, whereas in the first regime (<6.67) the 
effect of the index is positive and statistically significant. These empirical findings 
suggest that countries with an economic freedom index below this level tend to 
experience higher inequality when the index indicates stronger economic free-
dom, whereas countries with an economic freedom index above this level tend to 
experience reductions in inequality when the index displays higher levels of eco-
nomic freedom. Finally, the statistical significance of the LMF statistic rejects the 
null hypothesis that the coefficient of the slope coefficient is zero. Similar results 
are also obtained in terms of the components of the EFI index, with the stronger 
results coming from the SIZE component. 
In terms of the components of the EFI index, all three dimensions of that index 
support the presence of homogeneous results. With respect to the SIZE, TAX and 
LAB component, the thresholds appear at 6.22, 4.86 and 4.14, respectively. The 
EFI-SIZE, EFI-TAX and EFI-LAB effects below these levels are positive and 
statistically significant and above this level they are negative and statistically sig-
nificant. In both regimes the strongest effect appears in the EFI-SIZE case, indi-
cating that reducing the degree of government intervention below the correspond-
ing threshold level tends to display higher inequality when the index is on the rise, 
whereas with the component of the index above this level tends to display reduc-
tions in inequality for extra degrees in government intervention declines. The sta-
tistical significance of the LMF statistic in all three cases leads to the rejection of 
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366 remain robust across the geographical regions, with the testing procedure to sub-
stantially recommend the non-linear approach. The thresholds turn out to be 5.32, 
7.74, 4.36 and 5.08, for the case of Europe, America, Asia and Pacific country 
samples, respectively. 
6 PolIcY IMPlIcatIons anD conclUsIons
This study used panel-country data to study the dynamic relationship between 
economic freedom and income inequality. While the literature has devoted con-
siderable attention to studying the above nexus, the results provided having been 
inconclusive, the dynamic aspects have been studied primarily through a linear 
framework.
Unlike previous researchers, we employed both a linear and a non-linear panel 
cointegration model to identify the long-run equilibrium relationship between 
economic freedom and income inequality for the entire panel of countries and at 
the components of economic freedom index level. The linear long-run parameter 
estimates for the entire panel of countries showed that the association under study 
was negative, while the non-linear long-run parameter estimates indicated that 
above a threshold point the association between economic freedom and income 
inequality retained its negative sign, while below this threshold point the associa-
tion turned out to be positive. In other words, the empirical findings, in terms of 
the non-linear long-run model, displayed that beginning from a low level of eco-
nomic freedom, a higher level of this index generated more inequality as the par-
ticipants in the upper part of the income distribution benefit relatively more than 
the lower-level participants. As increases of the index continue, then the lower-
level participants tend to experience larger relative income gains, while these find-
ings were robust to the components of the Economic Freedom Index as well.
With regard to the policy implications of our findings, the results suggest that once 
the threshold is overtaken, economic freedom should promote greater equality in 
income distribution. The movement from the low phase of economic freedom to 
the high phase will not occur automatically. Reducing the size of government and 
increased human capital accumulation will permit progression to the next phase. 
The results additionally suggest that countries face a trade-off between higher per 
capita income and income equality, and unemployment and income inequality. 
The nature and extent of the perceived “trade-off” between unemployment and 
inequality are also subject to policy interventions. The results demonstrate the 
risks of the initial phase of economic freedom where an increase in inequality 
requires a pro-active stance by policy makers to take freedom to the next phase. 
The distributional impact of any exogenous shock is not predetermined. Even if a 
shock primarily or disproportionately affected particular income-earners, some of 
these costs can be redistributed (through fiscal and other measures) in such a way 
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367aPPenDIX
The study includes the following countries:
europe = Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portu-
gal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K.
america = Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Equator, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, U.S., Venezuela.
asia = Brunei, Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Malay-
sia, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Singapore, South Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan.
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